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ABSTRACT: The paper examines key changes in central-provincial 
government financial arrangements and their effects on provincial economic 
disparities in Vietnam over the period 2000-2008. We find that after 2004, 
transfers from the central to provincial governments conformed much more 
closely to objective and pre-determined criteria than before. Econometric 
estimations indicate that in the post-2004 sub-period, poorer provinces obtained 
more-than-proportionate assistance from the central government, and the 
favourable treatment was statistically significant. Responses from interviews and 
statistical data suggest that transfers from the central government played an 
important role in reducing poverty and provincial output disparities after 2004. 
The difficulties experienced by the central government in securing adequate 
resources to finance such transfers, the over-reliance of some provinces on the 
transfers, and related policy implications are also discussed in the paper. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
   In a recent study of economic disparities across the provinces of 
Vietnam, Vu, et al. (2011) found that although provincial levels of output 
per capita diverged over the study period 1990-2008, the trend was 
reversed around 2004 (for more details, see Figure 1 below). These 
authors also offered a number of possible explanations for this trend 
reversal, one of which was the increased role of central-provincial 
government financial relations in response to the above disparities. This 
paper further develops this theme by examining more closely financial 
arrangements between central and provincial levels of government in 
Vietnam before and after 2004, and by analysing the role of transfers 
from the central to provincial governments in helping to reduce poverty 
and provincial output disparities. More specifically, the focus is on the 
following research questions: 
 
(a) How did key features of the central-provincial government 
financial relations in Vietnam change after 2004? 
 
(b) How important were transfers from the central government in 
helping to reduce poverty and provincial output disparities? 
 
(c) What have been the main issues in implementing the central-
provincial government financial relations to address 
provincial output disparities? 
 
   In order to answer the above questions, both qualitative and quantitative 
methods were employed including in-depth interviews, analysis of 
available official documents, and econometric analyses. The paper’s main 
contributions lie in the use of and interpretation of recent data, as well as 
in the analysis of the interviews and synthesis of findings therefrom. The 
paper is organised as follows. Following this section, Section 2 presents a 
brief review of a number of relevant previous studies of government 
responses to regional output and/or income disparities and poverty, and 
some background information regarding Vietnam’s geography. Section 3 
outlines the research methods, while Section 4 describes data sources. 
Section 5 discusses the findings and Section 6 provides a summary of the 
main points raised.  
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Figure 1. Disparity in GDP Per Capita across Provinces.  
Source: Vu, et al. (2011). 
 
2. RELEVANT PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
   In a recent report, World Development Report (2009) argued that, if 
appropriately designed and implemented, policies intended to reduce 
inequalities between poor and rich regions in a given country may benefit 
not only the poorer regions but the richer ones as well. The report 
differentiated between policies involving universal institutions (spatially 
blind policies), infrastructure (spatially connective policies), and 
incentives (spatially focused policies). Institutions-based policies consist 
of such national polices as income tax systems, education, and health 
care. Infrastructure polices involve investments connecting places, such 
as interregional highways and railroads, and information and 
communication technologies and telecommunications networks. 
Incentive policies comprise spatially targeted measures to stimulate 
economic growth in poor areas, such as investment subsidies, tax rebates, 
local infrastructure development, and special regulations for export 
processing zones. Where there are few obstacles to labour and capital 
mobility, spatially connective initiatives can be particularly useful in 
reducing disparities. By contrast, in countries fragmented by linguistic, 
religious, or ethnic divisions, spatially targeted interventions may be an 
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appropriate method to address these disparities. In this scheme of 
classification, national inter-governmental financial relations are part of 
the institutions-based policies. 
   As highlighted in Table 1 findings from previous studies of the impact 
of inter-governmental transfers on inter-regional disparities have been 
mixed. Kaufman et al. (2003) found that equalization transfers from the 
federal government in Canada stimulated provincial output convergence 
and reduced disparities across provinces during the period 1961-2000. 
Similarly, Rodriguez (2006) reported that inter-provincial transfers 
played a vital role in accelerating the convergence process for Canadian 
provinces during the period 1926-1999. Akai and Hosio (2009) found that 
fiscal decentralization in the USA gave low-income counties greater 
autonomy and contributed to decreased inter-county inequality. In 
contrast, Garcia-Milà and McGuire (2001) found that inter-regional 
transfers in Spain were not effective in improving the economic 
performance of poor regions, but concluded that the transfers were not 
sufficiently large to achieve the desired improvement. 
   More generally, Lessmann’s (2006) cross-section analysis of data for 
17 OECD countries during the period 1980-2001 indicated that central 
government grants played an important role in helping poorer regions to 
catch up with richer ones. In a subsequent study, however, Kessler and 
Lessmann (2008) applied panel-data techniques to data from 23 OECD 
countries for the period 1982-2000 and found that countries with higher 
levels of redistributive governmental transfers actually experienced 
greater inter-regional divergence: the equalisation payments tended to 
mitigate migration from poorer to richer regions and therefore hindered 
the convergence process. 
   Findings from studies undertaken for China (which, like Vietnam, has 
been in a transition from the central planning system to a market 
economy) are of special relevance to the present study. Raiser (1998) 
argued that the rate of convergence in income per capita across the 
provinces of China decreased after 1985 because the inter-provincial 
fiscal transfer mechanism at the time tended to favour the richer 
provinces. After a reform of the tax system in 1994, however, Jiang and 
Zhao (2003) found that such transfer payments played an important role 
in reducing regional disparities during the period 1995-2000. Dabla-
Norris (2005) argued that several major issues in intergovernmental fiscal 
relations remained after 1994, and in particular, that revenue-sharing 
arrangements should be further adjusted in favour of the poorer 
provinces. 
Vietnam’s Responses to Provincial Economic Disparities                                                                                                                                107 
Through Central-Provincial Government Financial Relations 
 
Table 1. Previous studies of the impact of inter-governmental transfers on inter-regional disparities. 
 
Authors Year Country Data sample Techniques Findings 
Kaufman, Swagel 
& Dunaway 
2003 Canada 1961-2000 Panel data  Equalization transfers from the federal government stimulated provincial 
output convergence and reduced provincial disparities. 
Rodriguez 2006 Canada 1926-1999 Time-series  Inter-provincial transfers accelerated the convergence process for the 
provinces. 
Akai & Hosio 2009 USA 1993-2000 Cross-sectional data Fiscal decentralization gave low-income counties greater autonomy and 
contributed to decreased inter-county inequality. 
Garcia-Milà & 
McGuire 
2001 Spain 1977-1992 Time-series Inter-regional transfers were not effective in improving the economic 
performance of poor regions, but the transfers were not sufficiently large to 
achieve the desired improvement.  
Lessmann  2006 17 OECD 
countries 
1980-2001 Cross-sectional data 
and  panel data 
Central government grants played an important role in helping poorer 
regions to catch up with richer ones. 
Kessler & 
Lessmann  
2008 23 OECD 
countries 
1982-2000 Cross-sectional data 
and panel data 
Countries with higher levels of redistributive governmental transfers 
experienced greater inter-regional divergence: the equalisation payments 
tended to mitigate migration from poorer to richer regions and therefore 
hindered the convergence process.  
Raiser  1998 China 1978-1992 Cross-sectional data 
and panel data 
Rate of convergence in income per capita across the provinces decreased 
after 1985 because the inter-provincial fiscal transfer mechanism tended to 
favour the richer provinces. 
Jiang & Zhao  2003 China 1995-2000 Descriptive analyses 
and cross-sectional 
data 
Transfer payments played an important role in reducing regional disparities 
Source: the Authors. 
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Table 1. (Continued) Previous studies of the impact of inter-governmental transfers on inter-regional disparities. 
 
Authors Year Country Data sample Techniques Findings 
Dabla-Norris 2005 China 1994 tax reform & 
after 
Descriptive analyses Revenue-sharing arrangements should be further adjusted in favour 
of the poorer provinces. 
Yao 2009 China 1999, 2003, 2006 Descriptive analyses Government responses to inter-regional disparities through major 
programs such as “Go West”, “Reviving the Northeast”, and 
“Central Rising” were analysed. These programs focused on 
infrastructure building, social development through education and 
public health, and the likes, but offered little new information on 
inter-governmental fiscal relations. 
Chen & 
Groenewold 
2010 China 2000-2006 Simulation models Policies analysed aimed to reduce disparities between 
manufacturing-intensive and agriculture-intensive provinces 
through productivity improvements in agriculture, with little 
discussion of inter-governmental transfers. 
Bird, Litvack & 
Rao 
1995 Vietnam 1992-1993 Descriptive analyses 
and cross-sectional 
data 
Pro-poor services were underfunded, especially in the poorer areas. 
Well-designed inter-governmental transfers could play an important 
role in generating additional revenues for poorer provinces. 
Rao, Bird & 
Litvack 
1998 Vietnam 1992-1993 Descriptive analyses 
and cross-sectional 
data 
The high poverty rates in rural areas led to a severe shortage of 
resources at the provincial level and an allocation system that 
favoured richer provinces rather than poorer ones. 
Martinez-
Vazquez & 
Gomez 
2005 Vietnam The 2002 State 
Budget Law 
Descriptive analyses Briefly described revenue assignments, expenditure assignments, 
inter-governmental transfer mechanism, and borrowing of local 
governments, but did not analyse the role of subsidies from the 
central government in helping to reduce poverty and provincial 
output disparities.   
Source: the Authors. 
Vietnam’s Responses to Provincial Economic Disparities                    109 
Through Central-Provincial Government Financial Relations 
 
 
   More recently, Yao (2009) studied government responses to inter-
regional disparities through major programs such as “Go West”, 
“Reviving the Northeast”, and “Central Rising” which focused on 
infrastructure building, social development through education and public 
health, but offered little new information on inter-governmental fiscal 
relations. Similarly, Chen and Groenewold (2010) concentrated on 
policies designed to reduce disparities between manufacturing-intensive 
and agriculture-intensive provinces through productivity improvements in 
agriculture, with little discussion of inter-governmental transfers. 
   There are relatively few empirical studies of government responses to 
poverty and regional income disparities in Vietnam. Bird et al. (1995) 
examined data from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) 1992-
1993 and found that pro-poor services were underfunded, especially in 
the poorer areas: they argued that well-designed inter-governmental 
transfers could play an important role in generating additional revenues 
for poorer provinces. In the same vein, Rao et al. (1998), suggested that 
one of the reasons for the high poverty rates observed in rural areas was a 
severe shortage of resources at the provincial level and an allocation 
system that favoured richer provinces rather than poorer ones. Martinez-
Vazquez and Gomez (2005) briefly described revenue assignments, 
expenditure assignments, inter-governmental transfer mechanisms, and 
borrowing of local governments pursuant to the 2002 State Budget Law, 
but did not analyse the role of subsidies from the central government in 
helping to reduce poverty and provincial output disparities. Bjornestad 
(2009) examined cross-sectional data for 2002, 2004, and 2006 and found 
that fiscal transfers per capita from the central to provincial governments 
were positively correlated with provincial poverty rates. More recently, 
Nguyen and Anwar (2011) argued that inter-governmental transfers had a 
negative effect on provincial economic growth during the period 2002-
2007. However, this finding should be interpreted with caution, as the 
cited period includes a possible structural break in 2004, when the 2002 
State Budget Law came into effect. 
 
3. BACKGROUND TO THE VIETNAMESE CASE 
 
   Lying on the eastern part of the Indochinese peninsula, Vietnam is a 
strip of land shaped like the letter “S”, with an area of approximately 
331 000 square kilometres and a population of nearly 87.8 million (GSO, 
2011). The country borders China to the north, Laos and Cambodia to the 
west, the East Sea to the east and the Pacific Ocean to the east and south. 
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The country’s total length from north to south is about 1 650 kilometres 
with a coastline of around 3 260 kilometres and an inland border of 
roughly 4 510 kilometres. In administrative terms Vietnam is divided into 
64 provinces (see Figure 2). These provinces are frequently grouped into 
eight regions: the North West, North East, Red River Delta, North 
Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands, South East, and 
Mekong River Delta regions (Figure 3). For the present purposes, it is 
useful to classify the 64 provinces into four groups (richer, average, 
poorer, and remote and poor) based on their respective levels of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 2008 and (in the case of the last 
group) their locations (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Provincial Map of Vietnam. Source: the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam. 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam’s Responses to Provincial Economic Disparities                    111 
Through Central-Provincial Government Financial Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Regional Map of Vietnam. Source: the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. 
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Figure 4. Groupings of Provinces by Income. Note: The provinces are grouped on 
the basis of GDP per capita estimates for 2008. Source: the Authors. 
 
4. METHODS AND MODELS 
 
   This paper uses a range of qualitative and quantitative analytical 
methods. Firstly, content analysis is applied to official documents, such 
as the State Budget Laws, government’s papers, World Bank’s reports, 
and previous studies to gain a systematic understanding of the key 
changes in Vietnam’s central-provincial government financial 
arrangements. Secondly, information from in-depth interviews is 
synthesised and cross-checked with statistical data to ascertain the role of 
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inter-governmental transfers in helping to reduce poverty and provincial 
output disparities. Responses from interviewees are also employed to 
analyse the main issues that have arisen in implementing inter-
governmental financial relations, with cross-checking through content 
analysis of documents and statistical analysis of available data. Thirdly, 
econometric regressions are employed to investigate patterns and trends 
in transfers from the central to provincial governments.  
   Specifically, the regressions portray a relationship whereby net 
transfers received by each province are expected to depend negatively on 
its GDP per capita level, as follows: 
 
                                                                                (1) 
 
 , 2, , ,
, 100
i t i t i t
i t
t
C B P
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GDPPerCapVN

                               (2) 
 
, 2
, 2
2
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i t
i t
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GDPPerCap
RGDPPC
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


 
  
 
                     (3) 
 
where NTPCi,t is the real net transfers per capita received by province i in 
year t, de-scaled by being expressed as a percentage of the real national 
GDP per capita in the same year; RGDPPCi,t-2 is the real GDP per capita 
of province i in year t-2, similarly de-scaled; Ci,t are real transfers from 
the central government to province i in year t; B2,i,t is real sharable 
revenue which was transferred to the central government by province i in 
year t; Pi,t is population of province i in year t; GDPPerCapVNt is the real 
national GDP per capita of Vietnam in year t; and GDPPerCapi,t-2 is the 
real GDP per capita of province i in year t-2.  
   The reason for choosing a two-year lag (t-2) for GDPPerCapi,t-2 is that 
according to the 2002 State Budget Law, provincial budget estimates 
(including transfers from the central government for the next financial 
year) are normally determined from October to December in the current 
financial year and based on the main provincial characteristics such as 
provincial terrain and level of development in the previous fiscal year. 
For robustness, a one-year lag (t-1) is also used in equation (1); as we 
shall see, however, the results are quite similar to those obtained with a 
two-year lag (t-2) (see Table 3 below).  
, 1, 1, , 2 2, 1,* *i t t t i t t i tNTPC a b RGDPPC b Dremote    
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   The dummy variable Dremotei is used because some remote provinces 
are characterised by not only low income levels, but also remoteness 
from major economic/commercial centres and high concentrations of 
ethnic minorities: transfers from the central government to these 
provinces tend to be far higher than to other provinces. Dremotei = 1 if 
province i is a very remote and mountainous province, zero if otherwise.  
   After equation (1) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on a 
cross-sectional basis, tests for normality and for heteroscedasticity of the 
residuals are conducted. Both null hypotheses (normality and 
homoscedasticity) are rejected for each of the years studied (2000 - 
2008). Therefore, robust standard errors and t-statistics (White, 1980) are 
used. 
   In recognition of the fact that the current State Budget Law came into 
effect in 2004, the standard Chow test (1960) is used to test for a possible 
structural break around 2004 in the series of weighted coefficient of 
variation (CVW) of provincial transfers per capita. The equation used to 
test for a break year is CVw = a + b*t + εt  where t is the relevant year, 
with CVw being computed as: 
 
 
2
W
pi
ii P
CV
s s
s


                              (4) 
 
where si is the transfer per capita of province i; s is the national mean 
per capita transfer; P is the national population; and pi is the population 
of province i. The Chow test results indicate that there was a break of the 
CVw of provincial transfers per capita in 2004, with the F-statistic (2,5) = 
10.31 compared with the F-critical (2,5) value of 5.79 (at the 5per cent 
significance level). Our content analysis of official documents and 
feedback from interviews also suggest a break date of 2004 (see below). 
Accordingly, the study period is divided into two sub-periods: 2000-2003 
and 2004-2008.   
   Utilising the knowledge of the above structural break and making the 
most of the availability of panel data, the following panel-data regression 
model is used: 
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i t i t i
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NTPC a b RGDPPC c Dremote
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b Dbreak RGDPPC 
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where NTPCi,t, RGDPPCi,t-2 and Dremotei are as defined above, and 
Dbreak2004 is equal to one during the sub-period 2004-2008, and zero 
during the sub-period 2000-2003. 
 
5. DATA SOURCES AND INTERVIEWS 
 
   The data used include real GDP per capita and real net transfers per 
capita at 1994 prices for 64 provinces of Vietnam. Data for GDP, 
population, public investment at the provincial level are available from 
the General Statistics Office (GSO), provincial websites and various Year 
Books. In addition, yearly data for subsidies from the central to provincial 
budgets were collected from the Ministry of Finance (MOF). As three of 
the 64 provinces, namely Dien Bien, Dak Nong, and Hau Giang were 
established only in 2004 (Resolution 22/2003/NQ-QH XI), their data 
have been combined with data for Lai Chau, Dak Lak, and Can Tho to 
represent the composite entities Lai Chau – Dien Bien, Dak Nong – Dak 
Lak, and Can Tho – Hau Giang, respectively, for the nine-year study 
period, 2000-2008. 
   Interviews were conducted with four central officials of the MOF and 
15 provincial officials of the Department of Finance of 15 provinces, 
namely Hoa Binh, Bac Giang, Hai Duong, Cao Bang, Lao Cai, Lang Son, 
Phu Tho, Hanoi, Thanh Hoa, Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, Kon Tum, Ho 
Chi Minh City, and Dong Nai. The reason for choosing central officials 
of the MOF is that the MOF plays an important role in implementing 
central and provincial government financial arrangements. The provincial 
officials were selected on the basis that their provinces were not only 
representative of the seven geographical regions of Vietnam but also 
representative of the three groups of rich, average, and poor provinces in 
terms of per capita GDP and level of subsidy from the central 
government. The poor group included Hoa Binh in the North West 
region; Cao Bang, Lao Cai, Bac Kan, Lang Son, Phu Tho and Bac Giang 
in the North East; and Kon Tum in the Central Highland regions. The 
average group comprised Hai Duong in the Red River Delta region, 
Thanh Hoa in the North Central Coast, and Quang Ngai and Quang Nam 
in the South Central Coast regions. The rich group consisted of Hanoi in 
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the Red River Delta region and Ho Chi Minh City and Dong Nai in the 
South East region (for more details, see Figure 2). 
 
6. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Main Features of Central-Provincial Government Financial Relations 
 
   Before 1996, central-provincial government financial arrangements in 
Vietnam were governed by a series of government Decrees and 
Resolutions. During the period 1997-2003, the arrangements were 
regulated by the first State Budget Law in 1996 and the amended 1998 
State Budget Law. The current arrangements have been implemented by 
the 2002 State Budget Law which was put into effect in 2004. This 
section will analyse the major features of the arrangements based on the 
development of the regulations. 
 
Before 1996 
 
   Central-provincial government financial arrangements in Vietnam were 
governed by a series of government Decrees and Resolutions including 
Decree 75/1945/SL-CTN, Decree 119/1967/NĐ-CP, Resolution 
186/1989/NQ-HĐBT, and Decision 168/1992/QĐ-HĐBT. Overall, under 
the Resolution 186/1989/NQ-HĐBT and the Decision 168/1992/QĐ-
HĐBT, budget revenue arrangements between central and provincial 
governments were determined annually by their negotiations (Bird et al., 
1995). Expenditures for development investment by provinces were also 
decided by negotiation and bargaining with the central government. 
Budgetary recurrent expenditure arrangements between central and local 
governments were, however, based yearly on norms specified for each 
item of expenditure including education, training, health, sports, 
administration, and culture and information, with arrangements finally 
decided after two or three rounds of negotiations. In most cases, 
population was the main factor taken into account when recurrent 
expenditures were determined; however, weights assigned to population 
tended to favour cities. For instance, the standardised norms for 1994 
required that the budgetary distribution norms in education and health in 
cities were about 1.40 times and 1.12 times higher than those in plain 
areas and low mountainous and remote areas, respectively (Bird et al., 
1995). The transfer mechanism from central to local governments was not 
explicit and there were no budgetary distribution norms for determining 
the transfers from central to local governments. Therefore, the amount of 
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the transfers was determined yearly based on negotiations and bargaining 
between central and local governments. In addition, the central authorities 
were responsible for determining the tax base and tax rates of all major 
taxes (Bird et al., 1995). 
 
From 1996 to 2003 
 
   Although budget arrangements between central and local governments 
under the 1996 State Budget Law and the amendment in 1998 were much 
improved compared with the previous regulations, shortcomings still 
existed. 
   Firstly, sub-national governments tended to overstate their revenue 
needs; therefore, negotiations between central and local governments in 
setting up the expenditure budget still occurred (McLure and Martinez-
Vazquez, 1998; Rao et al., 1998). In addition, the negotiated approach to 
budget formulation tended to favour richer provincial governments which 
had more influence on the central government, and therefore, led to an 
element of opaqueness, arbitrariness, and subjectivity (Rao, 2000). 
   Secondly, provincial governments tended to understate their revenue 
potential when they submitted their revenue budget proposals to the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). Therefore, the final budget proposal 
approved by the MOF for each province was the result of several rounds 
of negotiations between provincial authorities and the MOF and 
depended on the negotiating strength of the two parties, including the 
political power of particular provincial authorities. For that reason, the 
approach was, once again, not a transparent and certain system (McLure 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 1998). 
   Thirdly, although the transfer mechanism under the 1996 State Budget 
Law was determined on a formula-based general transfer for each 
province, specific-purpose transfers were insufficient and too fragmented 
(McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 1998). As a result, the amount of 
transfers was heavily influenced by negotiations and bargaining between 
central and local governments. 
   Fourthly, local governments still lacked borrowing powers to get 
additional resources (Rao, 2000). They also lacked revenue-raising 
powers because the central government was mainly responsible for 
determining the tax base and the rate structure of all taxes (Rao et al., 
1998; McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 1998). Local governments were 
only given powers to raise revenues from fees, tolls, and voluntary 
contributions from their communities. However, these resources were 
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very small and accounted for less than five per cent of their total 
expenditures even though they tended to make intensive use of their 
taxing powers (Rao, 2000). 
 
After 2004 
 
   Under the 2002 State Budget Law, revenue arrangements indicate 
explicitly which sources of revenue can be collected 100 per cent by the 
central or by the provincial governments, and which sources of revenue 
can be shared between them. A substantial change in revenue 
assignments, as stipulated in the 2002 State Budget Law compared with 
those indicated in the 1996 State Budget Law was that such assignments 
are only between the central and provincial governments. Provinces now 
have responsibility to set revenue assignments for the districts and 
communes in their territories. Therefore, the revenue assignments 
between provincial and local governments may provide provincial 
governments with budget flexibility, the ability to adapt to the particular 
circumstances in the province, and could generate high levels of 
equalization (Maztinez-Vazquez, 2004). 
   Expenditure arrangements between the central and provincial 
governments continue to be determined based on norms. However, 
provincial recurrent expenditures have been determined by clearer norms 
since 2004 as indicated in Decision 139/2003/QĐ-TTg, Decision 
151/2006/QĐ-TTg, and Decision 59/2010/QĐ-TTg. Since 2007, norms 
applied when determining the capital expenditures of provinces have also 
been stipulated in Decision 210/2006/QĐ-TTg and Decision 
60/2010/QĐ-TTg. An interesting note is that a majority of these norms 
are much more favourable to poorer provinces (for more details, see 
Section 5.2). Similar to the case of revenue assignments, expenditure 
assignments are now only assigned for the central and provincial 
governments. Provincial governments have authority to specify 
expenditure assignments for their lower level governments, enabling 
them to assign budget expenditure tasks to their lower authorities in 
accordance with their varying specific needs. 
   Under the clearer budget distribution norms associated with the 2002 
State Budget Law, the current sharing system represents a considerable 
improvement compared with the one arising under the 1996 State Budget 
Law. Moreover, the sharing rates are decided for each particular province 
and the current sharing system tends to leave 100 per cent of the sharable 
taxes for poorer provinces. This may encourage provinces to make 
increased efforts to raise revenues, especially as poorer provinces 
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understand that they are usually allowed to keep 100 per cent of the 
shared taxes. However, a notable point is that under the 2002 State 
Budget Law, the central government is still fully responsible for 
introducing taxes, changing the structure of existing taxes, and fixing tax 
rates. Local governments are only allowed to introduce tolls for roads and 
certain fees for schools and hospitals that contribute insignificantly to 
their budgets (Maztinez-Vazquez, 2004; Bjornestad, 2009). 
   According to the World Bank (2005, volume I), another improvement 
was the use of fixed transfers during the budget stability period because 
fixed transfers help control negative incentives to revenue mobilisation 
by provincial governments and provide more certainty and stability. 
However, although progress has been made by the introduction of per 
capita expenditure norms to reasonably account for the relative 
expenditure needs at the central and provincial level, old physical 
standards or norms (such as number of staff in the measurement of 
expenditure needs) are still used by many provinces for allocation of 
resources to sub-national entities such as districts and communes. This 
leads to negative incentives in expenditure decisions, such as storing up 
of excess staffing capacity. 
   The 2002 State Budget Law and Circular 59/2003/TT-BTC provided 
that provinces be further allowed to mobilise domestic investment to 
obtain additional resources for their infrastructure development projects. 
The domestic sources of investment which provinces could mobilise 
included investment bonds issued by provincial governments and 
invested capital advanced from provincial Treasuries. In addition, 
provinces were allowed to borrow capital from the Vietnam Development 
Assistance Fund (VDAF was established according to Decree 
50/1999/NĐ-CP.) and the Vietnam Development Bank (VDB was formed 
according to Decision 108/2006/QĐ-TTg based on VDAF.). These 
bodies are permitted to establish development investment funds (as 
stipulated in Decree 138/2007/NĐ-CP) and land development funds (as 
specified in Decree 69/2009/NĐ-CP and Decision 40/2010/QĐ-TTg). 
 
Officials’ Assessment of Effectiveness of Transfers from Central 
Government 
 
   Sixteen out of nineteen officials interviewed indicated that the role of 
transfers from the central government in reducing poverty and provincial 
output disparities were somewhat effective before 2004. Only one 
interviewee felt that the transfers were effective, one interviewee 
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indicated that the transfers had no impact and one interviewee gave no 
rating about effectiveness of the transfers (for more details, see Table 2).  
   An examination of the reasons resulting in the lower effectiveness 
ratings indicates that the “ask and give” mechanism still applied in the 
central and provincial government financial arrangements before the 
2002 State Budget Law was put into effect in 2004. This means that the 
more transfers provinces could ask for and succeeded in receiving, the 
more expenditure they were able to make. They said that “the MOF and 
provincial Departments of Finance saw many local officials at the end of 
the period from 1996-2003 because the officials visited and asked the 
Ministry and the Departments for transfers for their next fiscal year”. 
 
Table 2. Ratings of Interviewees Regarding Effectiveness of the 
Transfers in Helping to Reduce Poverty and Provincial Output 
Disparities. 
 
Effectiveness of 
the transfers  
Effective Somewhat 
effective 
No 
impact 
No idea 
Before 2004 1 16  1 1 
After 2004 15  4   
Source: the Authors. 
 
   Fifteen out of nineteen interviewees indicated that transfers from the 
central government to the poorer provinces played an effective role in 
reducing poverty and provincial output disparities after 2004. Only four 
interviewees indicated that the transfers played an insignificant role in 
reducing poverty and output inequality between provinces (for more 
details, see Table 2).  
   The higher effectiveness ratings were caused by the transfer mechanism 
from the central to provincial budgets being implemented on clearer 
norms. More importantly, the norms have been much more systematic 
and favourable to poorer provinces. For example, Decision 
139/2003/QĐ-TTg required that the use of the number of school aged 
children to determine the distribution norm for education rather than the 
number of children enrolled in schools. This regulation benefited poor 
provinces because the number of children enrolled in schools in poorer 
provinces was usually proportionally lower than those in richer 
provinces. In addition, Decision 139/2003/QĐ-TTg, Decision 
151/2006/QĐ-TTg, and Decision 59/2010/QĐ-TTg instructing budget 
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distribution norms provided that ratios of recurrent investments per head 
in education in high mountainous areas to those in urban areas increase 
from 1.70 in 2004 to 2.02 in 2007 and 2.23 in 2011. Moreover, in the 
cases where provinces had extremely poor communes (According to 
Decision 135/1998/QĐ-TTg.) or districts (According to Resolution 
30a/2008/NQ-CP.), each school age child is additionally supported. For 
example, additional resources distributed for a school age child per year 
were about VND 49.4 thousand (nearly USD 3.1), VND 70 thousand 
(approximately USD 4.3), and VDN 140 thousand (about USD 7) in 
2004, 2007, and 2011, respectively. Similarly, recurrent investment 
norms per capita in health in high mountainous areas were 1.80, 2.39 and 
2.47 times those in urban areas in 2004, 2007, and 2011, respectively.  
   The officials’ assessment is broadly consistent with the available 
statistical data. As shown in Figure 1 above, inter-provincial disparity in 
output per capita experienced a reversal of trend around the year 2004, 
when both the weighted and unweighted CV of provincial GDP per capita 
began to fall noticeably, after having generally increased for (at least) 
more than a decade.   
   Since 2007, budget distribution norms also applied for determining 
capital expenditures. In particular, during the budget stability period 
2007-2010 the capital expenditures of provinces were determined by their 
cumulative score, based on five norms including population, level of 
development, natural areas, administrative units, and a supplementary 
norm. The higher cumulative scoring, provinces received more transfers 
from the central government. Of particular interest is that, special 
attention was paid to mountainous, remote, and disadvantaged areas as 
well as the ethnic minority areas when determining this cumulative score. 
For example, according to the population norm, if the population of a 
particular province was 100 000 people, the province would obtain one 
score. However, if population of a province was below 500 000, it 
received five scores. In addition, for each 100 000 ethnic minority people 
in a province one more score was allocated. Therefore, the population 
norm favoured provinces having less population and more ethnic 
minorities. Regarding the level of development, for each 10 per cent of 
poverty rating, provinces gained one score. With respect to the 
administrative unit norm, each mountainous or remote district province 
received a 0.2 score.  
   During the period 2011-2015, the capital expenditures of provinces will 
continue to be determined based on these five main norms; however, 
there are some changes in each particular norm and some of them further 
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favour the poorer provinces. For example, provinces receive 1.5 scores 
instead of one score if they have an ethnic minority of 100 000. In 
addition, each five per cent of poor households generate two scores. 
Similarly, for each mountainous or remote district that provinces have 
within their boundaries, they receive a 0.5 score rather than a 0.2 score. 
Moreover, each district located in a border area receives one score 
compared with the previous a 0.2 score. 
 
Econometric Analysis of Trends Underlying Transfers from Central 
Government 
 
   The findings gained from the analysis of interviews regarding the role 
of transfers from the central to provincial governments in helping to 
reduce poverty and provincial output disparities are broadly supported by 
our econometric analysis. As can be seen in Table 3, poorer provinces 
tended to receive more subsidies from the central government, especially 
after 2004. For example, in 2000, the ratio of net transfers per capita of a 
province to the real national GDP per capita (NTPCi,t) increased by 
roughly 0.06 percentage points if the (lagged) ratio of real GDP per capita 
of this province to the real national GDP per capita (RGDPPCi,t-2) 
decreased by one percentage point. Moreover, in 2008, the ratio of net 
transfers per capita of a province to the real national GDP per capita 
(NTPCi,t) increased by approximately 0.07 percentage points if the ratio 
of real GDP per capita of this province to the real national GDP per 
capita (RGDPPCi,t-2) declined by one percentage point. Although the 
changes in these ratios between 2008 and 2000 are numerally small, they 
are statically significant. 
   In particular, Bac Kan, one of the poorest provinces of Vietnam in 
terms of real GDP per capita, received the highest real transfers per capita 
from the central government in 2002 and 2006. Further, the real transfers 
per capita from the central government to Bac Kan increased nearly 1.3 
times, from VND 1.4 million in 2002 to VND 1.9 million in 2006. In 
contrast, richer provinces in terms of real GDP per capita tended to 
contribute more significantly to the central budget. For example, the real 
sharable revenues per capita of Ho Chi Minh City transferred to the 
central budget increased by 2.1 times, from VND 1.1 million in 2002 to 
VND 2.3 million in 2008. Similarly, the real sharable revenues per capita 
of Hanoi transferred to the central government almost doubled, from 
VND 0.7 million in 2002 to VND 1.3 million in 2008. 
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Table 3. Estimated Relationships Between the Ratios of Net Transfer Per 
Capita of Provinces to the National GDP Per Capita and the Ratios of 
GDP Per Capita of Provinces to the National GDP Per Capita. 
 
Dependent variable NTPCi,t 
Independent variables 
Year 
Intercept RGDPPCi,t-2 Dremotei 
Adjusted 
R2 
2000 9.8065*** -0.0554* 7.6267*** 0.4658 
2008 9.0649*** -0.0643*** 10.7484*** 0.5707 
 
 
Intercept RGDPPCi,t-1 Dremotei 
Adjusted 
R2 
2000 9.2406*** -0.0493* 7.8345*** 0.4403 
2008 9.6207*** -0.0701*** 10.5307*** 0.5804 
Note: Number of provinces = 61; *** Significant at one per cent, *Significant at 10 per cent. 
Source: the Authors 
 
   Provinces located in very remote areas (Dremotei = 1) tended to receive 
more subsidies from the central government after 2004. For instance, they 
received nearly 1.4 times higher in terms of ratios of real net transfers 
from the central government to the real national GDP per capita in 2008 
compared with those in 2000.  
   Comparing the adjusted R
2
 between 2008 and 2000, it can be seen that 
the estimated relationship for 2008 is a much better fit of the data 
available for that year (adjusted R
2
 = 0.57) than is the case for 2000 
(where adjusted R
2
 = 0.46). This is because the budget transfer 
mechanism from the central to provincial governments have been much 
more systematic and favourable to poorer provinces since the 2002 State 
Budget Law came into effect in 2004.  
   It is assumed that all individual province differences are captured by 
differences in the intercept parameters. The fixed effects estimator was 
applied because it has the advantage of capturing all time-invariant 
unobserved characteristics of each province whilst imposing no 
assumption between these characteristics and exogenous variables. Using 
a fixed effect model can also overcome endogenous issues of time-
invariant omitted variables. In addition, fixed effects estimation is 
preferred if the individual units are “one of a kind” and of interest, for 
example countries or provinces. However, in this case, a variable 
(Dremotei) was dropped from equation 5 because it is a time-invariant 
variable and already captured by using fixed effects.  
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   The results of panel data regressions (fixed effects) indicate that 
provinces having lower ratios of provincial GDP per capita to the national 
GDP per capita tended to receive more transfers from the central 
government. Indeed, during the sub-period 2000-2003, provinces with 
one percentage-point lower ratios of provincial GDP per capita to the 
national GDP per capita received approximately 0.11 percentage-point 
higher ratios of net transfers per capita to the national GDP per capita. 
   The regression results also indicate that there was a break in terms of 
ratios of real net transfers per capita to the real national GDP per capita 
around 2004 and the intercept term decreased by 0.90 percentage points 
(see Dbreak2004). This was because revenue arrangements and 
expenditure responsibilities tended to be further decentralised to 
provincial governments and the central government only transferred 
significant subsidies to poorer provinces.   
   More importantly, the slope of Dbreak2004*RGDPPCi,t-2 indicates that 
after 2004 the central government tended to transfer more than previously 
to poorer provinces. For example, from 2004 to 2008, the ratio of real net 
transfers per capita to the real national GDP per capita of a province 
increased by 0.008 percentage points if this province suffered from one 
percentage-point lower ratio of its real GDP per capita to the real national 
GDP per capita (for more details, see Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Panel Data Estimations (Fixed Effects). 
 
Dependent variable 
Independent variable 
NTPCi,t 
Intercept 17.8078
*** 
RGDPPCi,t-2 -0.1081
*** 
Dbreak2004 -0.9003
*** 
Dbreak2004*RGDPPCi,t-2 -0.0077
*** 
Adjusted R
2 
0.9451 
Note: ***Significant at one per cent; Number of provinces = 61; Sample period: 2000-2008; and 
Number of observations = 549. Source: the Authors 
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   The random effects estimator was applied for equation 5 when a time-
invariant variable (Dremotei) was controlled. The results of panel data 
regressions (random effects) indicate that provinces having lower ratios 
of provincial GDP per capita to the national GDP per capita tended to 
receive more transfers from the central government. Indeed, during the 
sub-period 2000-2003, provinces with one percentage-point lower ratios 
of provincial GDP per capita to the national GDP per capita received 
approximately 0.06 percentage-point higher ratios of net transfers per 
capita to the national GDP per capita. 
   Provinces located in very remote areas tended to receive more subsidies 
from the central government during the period 2000-2008. For instance, 
they received approximately 8.58 percentage-point higher ratios of real 
net transfers per capita to the real national GDP per capita for the sub-
period 2000-2003. Of particular interest is that the slope of 
Dremotei*Dbreak2004 indicates that after 2004 the central government 
tended to transfer more than previously to remote or mountainous 
provinces. For example, from 2004 to 2008, if a province was located in 
remote or mountainous area, the ratio of real net transfers per capita to 
the real national GDP per capita of this province increased by 1.58 
percentage points. 
   The regression results also indicate that there was a break in terms of 
ratios of real net transfers per capita to the real national GDP per capita 
around 2004 and the intercept term decreased by 1.35 percentage points 
(see Dbreak2004). This was because revenue arrangements and 
expenditure responsibilities tended to be further decentralised to 
provincial governments and the central government only transferred 
significant subsidies to poorer provinces.   
   More importantly, the slope of Dbreak2004*RGDPPCi,t-2 indicates that 
after 2004 the central government tended to transfer more than previously 
to poorer provinces. For example, from 2004 to 2008, the ratio of real net 
transfers per capita to the real national GDP per capita of a province 
increased by 0.008 percentage points if this province suffered from one 
percentage-point lower ratio of its real GDP per capita to the real national 
GDP per capita (for more details, see Table 5). 
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Table 5. Panel Data Estimations (Random Effects). 
 
Dependent variable 
Independent variable 
NTPCi,t 
Intercept 11.0168*** 
RGDPPCi,t-2 -0.0588
*** 
Dremotei 8.5828
*** 
Dbreak2004 -1.3502*** 
Dremotei* Dbreak2004 1.5840
*** 
Dbreak2004*RGDPPCi,t-2 -0.0076
*** 
Adjusted R2(weighted statistics) 0.2845 
Adjusted R2(unweighted statistics) 0.5416 
Note: ***Significant at one per cent; Number of provinces = 61; Sample period: 2000-2008; and 
Number of observations = 549. Source: the Authors 
 
Relative Importance of Transfers from Central Government 
 
   There are indications that public expenditure, especially public 
investment, at the provincial level has played a key role in reducing inter-
provincial disparities in recent years. For instance, while the domestic 
(total) investment-to-GDP ratio for the country as a whole increased from 
39 per cent in 2005 to 46 per cent in 2008, in Lai Chau-Dien Bien, one of 
the poorest provinces, it surged from approximately 8 per cent in 1990 to 
nearly 89 per cent in 2005 and to about 94 per cent in 2008. The number 
of provinces with an investment-to-output ratio at or above 50 per cent 
increased from 13 in 2001 (eight of which could be considered relatively 
poor) to 25 in 2005 and 30 in 2007 (17 of which were poor). Such 
extraordinarily high investment-output ratios implied that much of the 
goods and services that went into the relevant capital formation must 
have come from outside the province. In other words, it must have been 
imported from other provinces or from overseas. Typically the 
investment would involve the construction of infrastructure for which the 
central government must pay the lion’s share, either directly or through 
transfers to the relevant provincial authorities. 
   In interviews, both central and provincial officials confirmed that 
subsidies from the central government to provinces, especially poor 
provinces, made very important contributions to provincial budgets, 
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poverty reduction, and mitigation of inter-provincial output disparity. The 
reason was that a majority of provinces did not have enough resources to 
meet their requirements for budget expenditure; therefore, they relied 
mainly on the transfers from the central government (for more details, see 
Table 6). 
 
Table 6. List of Provinces in Receipt of Net Transfers from the Central 
Budget and the Ratios of the Transfers to Provincial Budget Expenditures 
in 2008. 
 
Ratios of the transfers 
to provincial budget 
expenditures were 
Number of 
provinces 
Name of provinces 
above 70 per cent 7 
Lai Chau-Dien Bien, Son La, Hoa Binh, Ha 
Giang, Cao Bang, Yen Bai, and Quang Tri 
from 50 per cent to 70 
per cent 
22 
Lao Cai, BacKan, Lang Son, TuyenQuang, 
Thai Nguyen, Phu Tho, BacGiang, Ha Nam, 
Nam Dinh, Thai Binh, ThanhHoa, Nghe An, 
Ha Tinh, QuangBinh, Quang Nam, Kon 
Tum, Dak Nong-DakLak, NinhThuan, Ben 
Tre, TraVinh, SocTrang, and Bac Lieu 
from 30 per cent to 50 
per cent 
15 
Ha Tay, Hung Yen, NinhBinh, ThuaThien 
Hue, Quang Ngai, BinhDinh, Phu Yen, Gia 
Lai, Lam Dong, BinhThuan, Dong Thap, An 
Giang, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, and 
KienGiang 
below 30 per cent 6 
Hai Duong, BacNinh, BinhPhuoc, Tay 
Ninh, Long An, and Ca Mau 
Source: the Authors  
 
   It can be shown that poor provinces received subsidies including 
balancing transfers and targeted transfers from the central budget 
accounting for more than 70 per cent of their budget expenditures in 
2008, indicating that the subsidies played vital roles in generating their 
sources of budget expenditure. Indeed, the subsidies from the central 
budget to Ha Giang accounted for about 81 per cent of its total 
expenditures in 2008. Further, in 2008 the ratios of subsidies from the 
central budget of Cao Bang and Dien Bien were approximately 77 per 
cent and 75 per cent, respectively. 
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   In 2008, poor provinces having ratios of subsidies from the central 
government to their budget expenditures of between 50 per cent and 70 
per cent also showed that the subsidies contributed significantly to their 
budget expenditure. For instance, in 2008 the subsidies from the central 
budget to Bac Kan and Thanh Hoa accounted for 68 per cent and 64 per 
cent of their budget expenditures, respectively. 
   All provinces are encouraged to raise revenue from other resources 
such as advancing unused capital, issuing investment bonds, borrowing 
money from the provincial VDAF and VDB, establishing development 
investment funds, and forming land development funds. However, the 
results from mobilising the resources vary, and provinces have different 
opinions about the importance of the utilisation of such resources. 
   Firstly, in the opinion of poorer provinces, unused capital advanced 
from their Treasuries or borrowed from their VDAF and VDB 
contributed moderately to their development investment because the 
investment mobilised from these sources is small compared with their 
overall budget expenditures. For example, Kon Tum borrowed VND 15 
billion from the VDAF for its irrigation system improvement, but this 
accounted for only about 1.1 per cent of its budget expenditures in 2005. 
In addition, a majority of poor provinces have not issued investment 
bonds to raise additional resources because their investment bonds may 
not be attractive to domestic organisations or local people. Therefore, 
investment bonds still do not play any role in generating additional 
sources for their budgets. Only very few poor provinces, such as Bac 
Giang, issued investment bonds to get additional resources but the result 
was not significant. For example, the total investment bonds issued by 
Bac Giang was VND 9.73 billion and accounted for only one per cent of 
its total budget expenditure in 2002.  
   Secondly, poor provinces such as Phu Tho and Thanh Hoa reported that 
although their land development funds were established in 2010, the roles 
of these funds in contributing additional resources to their budget 
expenditures were also limited. For example, the investment of land 
development funds of Phu Tho and Thanh Hoa was about VND 60 billion 
and VND 140 billion accounting for only 1.4 per cent and 1.6 per cent of 
their budget expenditures in 2010, respectively.  
   From the above analysis, it is clear that wealthier provinces could get 
additional resources from these alternative sources more readily than 
poorer provinces. Subsidies from the central authorities were still the 
main sources contributing additional resources to budget expenditures of 
poorer provinces.  
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   Some poor provinces appear to have relied heavily on transfers from 
the central authorities for the following reasons. Firstly, their sources of 
revenue including revenues which they could collect totally and revenues 
shared with the central government did not meet their budget 
expenditures. Indeed, in 2008, the total revenue collected by Ha Giang, 
one of poorest provinces, was only VND 214 billion, accounting for 
approximately 5.7 per cent of its total budget expenditure. Secondly, 
contributions of organisations and individuals to the budgets of poorer 
provinces were insignificant as people mainly contributed in kind to 
infrastructure development projects in their areas. For instance, the 
contributions of individuals and organisations of Lang Son were roughly 
VND one billion, accounting for only 0.03 per cent of its budget 
expenditure in 2008. Thirdly, although provinces were allowed to 
mobilise additional resources to meet their requirements of budget 
expenditures, the capital mobilised by poorer provinces was insignificant. 
Therefore, transfers from the central government remain the main 
resources contributing considerably to budget expenditures of poor 
provinces. 
 
Securing Adequate Resources to Finance Transfers from Central 
Government 
 
   Both central and provincial officials indicated that the central 
government faced difficulties in securing resources for redistribution to 
poorer provinces because of the following: 
   Firstly, sources of revenue of the central government (including 
revenues of which the central government could collect 100 per cent as 
well as sharable taxes with provincial governments) tended to decrease 
due to the negative impact of both economic recessions during the 
periods 1997-1998 and 2007-2008 and high inflation during the period 
2007-2008. Indeed, the national economic growth rate declined from 
approximately 9.3 per cent in 1996 to nearly 8.2 per cent in 2006 and 
then 5.3 per cent in 2009. As a result, the growth rate of revenues 
collected by the central government decreased from approximately 41 per 
cent in 2002 to 21 per cent in 2004 and to 10 per cent in 2008.  
   Secondly, few richer cities and provinces were in a position to transfer 
their revenues to the central budget. Indeed, in 2003, only five of 61 
provinces (namely Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai, Binh Duong, 
and Ba Ria Vung Tau) transferred some of their revenues to the central 
budget. Although the number of provinces transferring their revenues to 
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the central budget increased by 2008, only eleven provinces (comprising 
Quang Ninh, Hanoi, Hai Phong, Vinh Phuc, Da Nang, Khanh Hoa, Ho 
Chi Minh City, Binh Duong, Dong Nai, Ba Ria Vung Tau, and Can Tho) 
contributed some of their revenues to the central budget, and these 
provinces only accounted for approximately 25 per cent of the national 
population of Vietnam in 2008 (for more details, see Table 7). Further, 
although the contributions of these richer provinces to the central budget 
increased after 2004, the ratios of richer provincial contributions to the 
total subsidies from the central to provincial governments remained 
almost unchanged at approximately 66 per cent during the sub-period 
2005-2008. 
 
Table 7. List of Provinces and Cities Which Transferred Revenues to the 
Central Budget in 2003 and 2008. 
 
                    Year                     
Provinces  
2003 2008 
Number of 
provinces 
5 11 
Names of provinces Hanoi, Ho Chi 
Minh City, 
Dong Nai, Binh 
Duong, and Ba 
RiaVung Tau 
QuangNinh, Hanoi, Hai 
Phong, VinhPhuc, Da Nang, 
KhanhHoa, Ho Chi Minh 
City, Binh Duong, Dong Nai, 
Ba RiaVung Tau, and Can 
Tho 
Source: the Authors 
 
   Thirdly, a majority of provinces received subsidies from the central 
government, some of these provinces were extremely poor and relied 
mainly on these subsidies. In particular, in 2008, seven poor provinces 
(including Lai Chau-Dien Bien, Son La, Hoa Binh, Ha Giang, Cao Bang, 
Yen Bai, and Quang Tri) received transfers from the central budget, and 
these transfers accounted for more than 70 per cent of their budget 
expenditures. Ha Giang received transfers up to nearly 81 per cent of its 
budget expenditure in 2008. In the same year 22 other poor provinces 
received subsidies of 50 per cent to 70 per cent, while 15 provinces 
received transfers from the central budget between 30 per cent and 50 per 
cent of their budget expenditures. Further, only six provinces received 
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subsidies of less than 30 per cent of their budget expenditures from the 
central government (for more details, see Table 6).  
   Fourthly, the central government was limited to the amount it could 
borrow from domestic and international organisations due to a legislated 
limit on the size of the budget deficit. For example, the budget deficit 
approved by the Vietnamese National Assembly was 5.0 per cent of GDP 
in 2008 and 6.2 per cent of GDP in 2010 (MOF, 2008; 2010).  
   Fifthly, budget expenditure tasks undertaken by the central government 
for important development investment projects are heavy and this put 
more pressure on the central budget. For example, in 2005, the 
investment in the Dung Quat Oil Refinery project was approximately US 
dollar three billion, accounting for six per cent of the nominal GDP of 
Vietnam (The Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2005). 
Further, changes of government policies also put additional pressure on 
the central budget. For instance, in 2011, total state budget allocated for 
the salary reform policy was VND 27 000 billion, accounting for 
approximately 4.5 per cent of the total national budget expenditure when 
the basic salary was adjusted from VND 730 thousand per month in 2010 
to VND 830 thousand per month (MOF, 2011). As a result, the national 
budget deficit occurred for several years. For example, the ratios of 
national budget deficit to GDP were approximately five per cent in 2000, 
4.9 per cent in 2004, five per cent in 2006, and 4.6 per cent in 2008 
(MOF, 2000; 2004; 2006; 2008).  
   Sixthly, provinces, especially poor provinces are frequently and heavily 
affected by natural disasters. Therefore, the central budget is subject to 
more pressure when blocks of urgent subsidies are required to help these 
provinces overcome the disasters. For instance, in 2009, the ‘main 
projects’ invested through several years as well as the agricultural sector 
of Kon Tum were almost completely destroyed by storm N09, called a 
historic storm. As a result, about VND 250 billion from the central 
budget, accounting for approximately 14 per cent of Kon Tum’s budget 
expenditure in 2009, was subsidised for Kon Tum to overcome this 
severe disaster” (A provincial official of Department of Finance of Kon 
Tum). 
   Finally, an increasing gap in socio-economic development between 
poor and rich regions as well as between poor and rich provinces also put 
more pressure on the central budget during the new budget stabilisation 
period. This is because the central government has responsibilities for 
solving uneven development between regions and between provinces. For 
example, the gap in GDP per capita between the poorest North West 
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region and the richest South East region increased from approximately 
3.6 in 1990 to nearly 5.3 in 2004 and 4.9 in 2008. Further, the gap in 
GDP per capita between the richest city (Ho Chi Minh City) and the 
poorest province (Ha Giang) increased from 6.5 in 1990 to 7.2 in 2004 
and 6.9 in 2008. 
   In conclusion, as discussed previously, under the 2002 State Budget 
Law, the transfers from the central government to poorer provinces in 
Vietnam played an important role in balancing the gap in revenues and 
expenditures of poorer provinces, and in promoting their economic 
growth. The transfers also contributed to reducing output disparities 
between poorer provinces and richer ones. Therefore, the transfer 
mechanism should be continuously implemented to safeguard resources 
for poorer provinces. However, the output inequality across provinces in 
Vietnam was still high (for more details, see Figure 1), and the central 
government faced difficulties in securing resources for re-allocation to 
poorer provinces. For that reason, solutions for improving the budget 
capacity of poorer provinces should be considered to reduce budget 
pressure on the central government. For example, additional special 
policies attracting investors, especially foreign investors to invest in 
infrastructure through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Transfer 
(BT), and Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects should be issued to 
promote socio-economic development in poorer provinces. This is 
because although the distribution of FDI across provinces has become 
less uneven since 2004, about 73 per cent of FDI in Vietnam in 2008 was 
still concentrated in 11 richer cities/provinces including Ho Chi Minh 
City, Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Hanoi, Ba Ria Vung Tau, Da Nang, Hai 
Phong, Can Tho, Quang Ninh, Vinh Phuc, and Khanh Hoa. Furthermore, 
policies aimed at improving public investment efficiency and stabilising 
the economy should be strengthened to generate more resources for the 
central and local governments because public investment in Vietnam has 
recently tended to be unaffordable, inefficient, and unsustainable 
(Vietnam Development Report, 2012). Also, according to the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, the overall global competitiveness 
index of Vietnam is just above average, for example 70/148 countries. 
The two other indicators including efficiency enhancer, and innovation 
and sophistication factors are even worse, for instance 74/148 and 85/148 
countries, respectively. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
   This paper examines changes in key features of central-provincial 
government financial arrangements in Vietnam during the period 2000-
2008, and their effects on provincial economic disparities. Our analysis 
suggests that after 2004, transfers from the central government to 
provincial governments conformed much more closely to objective, pre-
determined criteria than before, due to the implementation of the new 
Law which came into effect in 2004. Econometric estimations confirm 
that in the post-2004 sub-period, poorer provinces obtained more-than-
proportionate assistance from the central government, and the favourable 
treatment was statistically significant. Responses from interviews and 
statistical data indicate that transfers from the central government played 
an important role in reducing poverty and provincial output disparities 
after 2004. The paper also highlights the difficulties experienced by the 
central government in securing adequate resources to continue financing 
such transfers, and by many poorer provinces in trying to reduce their 
heavy reliance on transfers from the central government. Thus there is a 
continuing need to enhance the budget capacity of poorer provinces, as 
well as to improve the efficiency of public investments.  
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